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NOTE
Children Are Our Future:
Resurrecting Juvenile Rehabilitation
Through “Raise the Age” Legislation in
Missouri
Brittany L. Briggs*

I. INTRODUCTION
On Monday, October 29, 2018, retired St. Louis Police Sergeant Ralph
Harper was murdered during a botched robbery.1 Two juveniles, ages fifteen
and sixteen, were accused of carrying out the attempted robbery gone wrong.2
Because of their ages, they were charged in juvenile court, where punishments
are more individualized and sentences are generally less harsh than adults
would receive.3 To determine if the boys would be subject to the adult
criminal system, they were granted a transfer hearing where a juvenile court
judge determined whether the nature of the accused crime and the juveniles’
individual characteristics would be better addressed by the adult criminal
justice system.4
At the transfer hearing, the two juveniles made their cases about why
they belonged in the juvenile system.5 For a crime he committed at age
fifteen, one juvenile was charged as an adult with second degree murder,
* B.A., University of Missouri-Columbia, 2017; J.D. Candidate, University of
Missouri School of Law, 2020; Managing Editor, Missouri Law Review, 2019–2020.
A special thanks to Professor Douglas Abrams for his guidance and to the editorial
staff of the Missouri Law Review for their insightful edits.
1. Christine Byers, Boys, 15 and 16, Charged in Juvenile Court with Murder of
Retired St. Louis Police Sergeant, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (Oct. 31, 2018)
https://www.stltoday.com/news/local/crime-and-courts/boys-and-charged-injuvenile-court-with-murder-of-retired/article_f4f0d61a-c067-55d4-920e6d435ba71a2c.html [perma.cc/XTB8-7W7H].
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Joel Currier, Second Teen Charged With Murder of Retired St. Louis Police
Sergeant, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (June 14, 2019), https://www.stltoday.com/news/
local/crime-and-courts/second-teen-charged-with-murder-of-retired-st-louis-police/a
rticle_0d4aee19-3a35-59ee-b3d6-0f3173f7bfff.html [perma.cc/7SPE-BB6Y].
5. Id.
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armed criminal action, attempted robbery, tampering, and resisting arrest.6 He
eventually pleaded guilty and was sentenced to a twenty-year suspended
sentence in a dual jurisdiction juvenile program.7 If the juvenile successfully
completes juvenile programming, including counseling and vocational
training, he could be released on probation when he is twenty-one years old.8
The other juvenile who participated in Sergeant Harper’s death also received
juvenile detention for his role.9 Ironically, one of the boys’ seventeen-yearold brother, Julian Mathews, charged with a lesser crime unrelated to the
murder, did not receive the same chance.
Julian was arrested on the same day as the boys but was not involved in
the attempted robbery or murder.10 He was charged with two misdemeanors
upon his arrest.11 Because Julian was seventeen years old when he was
arrested, he was charged as an adult.12 Weeks before Sergeant Harper’s death,
Julian had been arrested and charged with two felonies: felony possession of
marijuana and unlawful possession of a weapon.13 Unlike his brother, he will
not receive the many benefits of juvenile court. If convicted, he will carry a
felony criminal record and its collateral consequences with him for the rest of
his life. His younger brother, however, could avoid those negative
consequences in the juvenile system.
The difference between Julian and his brother’s cases demonstrates how
significant a year can be to a juvenile facing the criminal system. Soon,
seventeen-year-old juveniles such as Julian will be eligible to receive the
benefits of Missouri’s juvenile system. In recent years, state legislatures
across the country have made it harder to try juveniles in adult courts in a
legislative movement known as “Raise the Age.”14 Generally, Raise the Age
6. Erin Heffernan, Teen Charged With Murder of Retired St. Louis Police
Sergeant to be Tried as an Adult, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (June 11, 2019),
https://www.stltoday.com/news/local/crime-and-courts/teen-charged-with-murderof-retired-st-louis-police-sergeant/article_26f22109-7c05-5b1f-b67e07d4ca205f04.html [perma.cc/58KY-NYTS].
7. Teen Sentenced to Juvenile Detention for Role in Death of Retired St. Louis
Police Sergeant, KMOV4 (Dec. 12, 2019), https://www.kmov.com/news/teensentenced-to-juvenile-detention-for-role-in-death-of/article_6904b7d8-1d2b-11ea947e-83dd1f25e356.html [perma.cc/9KWN-V5VV].
8. Id.
9. Joel Currier, Teen Sentenced to Juvenile Detention in Killing of Retired St.
Louis Police Sergeant, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (Dec. 13, 2019),
https://www.stltoday.com/news/local/crime-and-courts/teen-sentenced-to-juveniledetention-in-killing-of-retired-st/article_90c9ead7-2040-505a-859e1d203607d608.html [perma.cc/3B3Y-WREE].
10. Byers, supra note 1.
11. Second degree tampering with a motor vehicle and resisting arrest. State v.
Mathews, Case No. 1822-CR03756 (St. Louis City Cir. Ct. Oct. 30, 2018).
12. Hefferman, supra note 6.
13. Id.
14. Brian Evans, ‘Raise the Age’ Passage Sets Missouri on Path to Re-Establish
Itself as Youth Justice Model, SPRINGFIELD NEWS-LEADER (May 26, 2018),
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legislation represents an evolution in thinking about juvenile justice. In 2018,
Missouri’s General Assembly joined the “Raise the Age” movement by
passing Senate Bill 793.15 On June 1, 2018, former Missouri Governor Eric
Greitens signed Senate Bill 793 into law, which will raise the age of criminal
adult prosecution from seventeen to eighteen.16 Missouri joins forty-five
other states and the District of Columbia that have passed similar “Raise the
Age” bills in recent years.17 Senate Bill 793 will not go into effect until
January 1, 2021, but when it does, seventeen-year-old juveniles who violate
the law will automatically be processed in Missouri’s juvenile courts.18 This
bill is good news both for the state of Missouri and its juveniles; it will shield
some juveniles from the adult criminal justice system and its often-irreparable
consequences while also lowering costs and recidivism rates for Missouri.
This Note examines the effects of Senate Bill 793 on Missouri and its
juveniles through the lens of historic shifts in the understanding of juvenile
justice. Part II of this Note reviews the historical background leading to the
creation of separate juvenile justice systems and the history of Missouri’s
juvenile justice system. Part III explores how the law has evolved as our
understanding of juveniles has evolved. Section A gives a brief history of
“Raise the Age” statutes across the United States. Section B details how the
United States Supreme Court decided to “raise the age” for the harshest types
of punishment: the death penalty and life without the possibility of parole.
Part IV is an in-depth look at Missouri Senate Bill 793 and addresses the twofold benefit of the change by first explaining why Senate Bill 793 is good for
Missouri’s juveniles, then discussing why the legislation is also good for
Missouri’s communities. Finally, Part IV analyzes possible future reforms to
make Missouri’s juvenile system better and Missouri’s juveniles safer.

II. CHARTING THE PATH TO THE MODERN JUVENILE JUSTICE
SYSTEM
The path to legal adulthood is incremental. In Missouri, the age of
majority – the age at which the law considers an individual fully mature – is

https://www.news-leader.com/story/opinion/readers/2018/05/26/raise-age-improvesmissouri-youth-justice/641299002/ [perma.cc/5QAX-236R].
15. Id.
16. See S.B. 793, 99th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2018); see also Kurt
Erickson, Here Are the Bills Gov. Eric Greitens Signed Before Leaving Office, ST.
LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, (June 1, 2018) https://www.stltoday.com/news/local/govtand-politics/here-are-the-bills-gov-eric-greitens-signed-before-leaving/article_d2132
b21-8db0-5d50-bed6-1d8ad4ec34b0.html [perma.cc/NRX5-YKWW]. The Governor
also signed Senate Bill 800 that same day, which contains identical “Raise the Age”
language as Senate Bill 793. S.B. 800, 99th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2018).
17. Evans, supra note 14.
18. S.B. 793, 99th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2018).
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eighteen, with few exceptions.19 Such exceptions include the age a person
may drive, get married, give sexual consent, and purchase and consume
tobacco products and alcohol. An individual may drive a car and get married
with parental consent at sixteen.20 A seventeen-year-old Missourian may
consent to engage in sexual activities.21 In some Missouri jurisdictions,
individuals may not buy tobacco products until they are twenty-one.22
Further, individuals may not purchase, possess, or consume alcohol until they
are twenty-one years old.23
By law, children are not mature enough to engage in many of the above
activities. However, in some instances the state still imposes criminal liability
on children. Children as young as twelve can be certified, tried, and sentenced
as adults in the Missouri criminal justice system.24 There is a tension between
imposing adult criminal liability on children by virtue of their actions while
simultaneously barring them because of their youth from driving, marrying,
voting, smoking, drinking alcohol, or making independent medical decisions.
The Section that follows aims to put this dichotomy in context by presenting
a brief history of the juvenile justice system, its goals, and its justifications.
Next, Section B offers an overview of the structure of Missouri’s juvenile
justice system and briefly explores why it is a model for other systems across
the United States.

A. Children Are Not Criminals: An Overview of the Juvenile Justice
System
Between 1968 and 1972, the United States saw a downward trend for the
age of majority from twenty-one to eighteen.25 In response, individuals began
calling for a change in the way society dealt with children in the criminal

19. See Bushell v. Scheep, 613 S.W.2d 689, 691 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981) (holding
the age of majority is attained at eighteen for most purposes).
20. See MO. REV. STAT. § 302.178(1) (2018) (setting the age to obtain a driver’s
license at sixteen); MO. REV. STAT. § 451.090 (2018) (setting the age of marriage to
sixteen with parental consent). In the last legislative session, Missouri passed Senate
Bill 655, which raised the age of marriage with parental consent from fifteen to sixteen
and prohibited the marriage of any person over the age of twenty-one to any person
under the age of eighteen. Michelle Madaras, New Law Cracks Down on Legal Age to
Marry in Missouri, FOX2NOW (Aug. 27, 2018), https://fox2now.com/2018/08/27/new
-law-cracks-down-on-legal-age-to-marry-in-missouri/ [perma.cc/4CY6-LUPG].
21. MO. REV. STAT. § 566.034 (2018) (stating seventeen-year old individuals can
consent to sexual contact with those twenty-one years or older).
22. See, e.g., COLUMBIA, MO., CODE ch. 11, art. X, § 11-316 (2019) (stating
tobacco products cannot be sold to persons under the age of twenty-one).
23. MO. REV. STAT. § 311.310 (2018) (stating businesses are prohibiting from
selling alcohol to individuals under the age of twenty-one).
24. MO. REV. STAT. § 211.071 (2018).
25. See generally Vivian E. Hamilton, Adulthood in Law and Culture, 91 TUL. L.
REV. 55 (2016) (outlining the historical trend of the age of majority).
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sphere.26 Prior to the creation of juvenile courts, children accused of crimes
were given harsh sentences and confined in adult prisons where conditions
were grim.27 Children were often viewed as miniature adults without
distinctive emotional and cognitive abilities.28
Throughout the nineteenth century, “child-savers” advocated for the
creation of separate juvenile courts.29 From the late-nineteenth century until
the eve of World War I, Progressive-Era reformers argued children were not
similar to adults and should not be treated as such.30 They argued poor
environments, rather than intentional behavior by juveniles, were contributing
to cases of delinquency.31 They began to push reforms that addressed the
harsh confinement conditions many child offenders faced. Such reforms
included curfew laws designed to keep juveniles inside and out of trouble
during the nighttime hours.32 Single mothers were offered governmentsubsidized stipends that allowed them to stay home with their children
because many feared sending single mothers to work would push young, poor,
and unsupervised children into lives of crime.33
These reforms were coupled with the creation of an entirely separate
juvenile justice court system. In 1899, Cook County, Illinois enacted the first
separate juvenile justice court in the United States.34 By 1925, nearly every
state maintained a juvenile court that, unlike the adult criminal justice system
that focused on punishment and confinement, focused on rehabilitation for
juvenile offenders.35 These new courts gave children an alternative means of
adjudication outside the adult criminal system. Juvenile courts also provided
treatments outside of mere confinement that focused on the needs of “abused,
neglected, delinquent, and dependent children.”36
26. DOUGLAS E. ABRAMS, SUSAN V. MANGOLD, AND SARAH H. RAMSEY,
CHILDREN AND THE LAW: DOCTRINE, POLICY, AND PRACTICE 932–46 (6th ed. 2017);
see also Hamilton, supra note 25, at 64–65; Megan E. Hay, Incremental
Independence: Conforming the Law to the Process of Adolescence, 15 WM. & MARY
J. WOMEN & L. 663, 667 (2009) (discussing the legal effects of the age of majority).
27. ABRAMS ET AL., supra note 26, at 934; Douglas E. Abrams, Lessons From
Juvenile Justice History in the United States, J. INST. JUST. INT’L STUD. 7, 8 (2004).
28. Abrams, supra note 27, at 8–9.
29. Id.
30. Jennifer M. O’Connor & Lucinda K. Treat, Getting Smart About Getting
Tough: Juvenile Justice and the Possibility of Progressive Reform, 33 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 1299, 1302–03 (1996).
31. Id. at 1303.
32. ABRAMS ET AL., supra note 26, at 934.
33. Id. These reforms were not without their flaws; they carried with them
problematic racial and socioeconomic stereotypes. See generally Cheryl Nelson
Butler, Blackness as Delinquency, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 1335 (2013).
34. ABRAMS ET AL., supra note 26, at 940.
35. Id. at 934.
36. Alicia N. Harden, Rethinking the Shame: The Intersection of Shaming
Punishments and American Juvenile Justice, 16 U.C. DAVIS J. JUV. L. & POL’Y 93, 100
(2012).
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These new juvenile courts were put to the test almost immediately. The
Great Depression struck the United States in 1929, and as a result, delinquency
rates rose as many children had to choose between attending school or
working to provide for their families.37 Some children resorted to theft to
avoid hunger. Juvenile delinquents from this era were some of the first to be
tried under the new paradigm guiding the juvenile courts: rehabilitation and
prevention over confinement and punishment.

1. Early Juvenile Courts and the Rehabilitative Model
Early juvenile justice courts had jurisdiction over four categories
concerning juveniles: abuse and neglect, adoption, status offenses, and
delinquency.38 Early juvenile courts were also courts of civil jurisdiction
meant to temper punishment with mercy by shielding juveniles from the
harshness of the criminal system.39 These courts sought to address the
misbehavior of juveniles by taking measures meant to rehabilitate them and
prevent them from committing future crimes.40 The rehabilitative model of
these courts was future-looking. It took the juvenile’s age and culpability into
account and addressed the child’s delinquency through programs and methods
that sought to prevent re-offending.41 The state, through the early juvenile
courts, sought “to replicate the environment that the child would enjoy in a
family setting.”42 In these courts, the judge was meant to sit as a fatherly
figure who dispensed justice with a focus on the juvenile’s individual needs
as a devoted parent would.43 This concept, known as parens patriae, focused
on the best interests of juveniles and the protection of society.44 To achieve
these goals, early juvenile justice courts had five distinguishing features from
ordinary criminal courts. These features were individualized treatment and
37. ABRAMS ET AL., supra note 26, at 932–46.
38. Abrams, supra note 27, at 8–14. The following focuses on the historical
background of the delinquency category.
39. ABRAMS ET AL., supra note 26, at 942. Confining juvenile delinquency
proceedings to protect juveniles also meant they sacrificed some rights afforded them
by the criminal justice system: for example, the right to a jury trial. See generally
Martin R. Gardner, Punitive Juvenile Justice and Public Trials by Jury: Sixth
Amendment Applications in a Post-McKeiver World, 91 NEB. L. REV. 1 (2012);
Jennifer M. Segadelli, Minding the Gap: Extending Adult Jury Trial Rights to
Adolescents While Maintaining a Childhood Commitment to Rehabilitation, 8
SEATTLE J. FOR SOC. JUST. 683 (2010); Cart Rixey, Note, The Ultimate
Disillusionment: The Need for Jury Trials in Juvenile Adjudications, 58 CATH. U. L.
REV. 885 (2009).
40. Timothy Casey, When Good Intentions Are Not Enough: Problem-Solving
Courts and the Impending Crisis of Legitimacy, 57 SMU L. REV. 1459, 1472 (2004).
41. Id. at 1471.
42. Id.
43. Anita Nabha, Shuffling to Justice: Why Children Should Not Be Shackled in
Court, 73 BROOK. L. REV. 1549, 1560 (2008).
44. O’Connor & Treat, supra note 30, at 1303.
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rehabilitation, civil jurisdiction, informal procedures, confidentiality, and
separating juveniles from adult offenders.45
These features were meant to protect juveniles from long-term negative
consequences of their childhood misbehavior. Juvenile courts had less formal
procedures to make it easier for the juvenile to understand the process to
which they were being subjected.46 To protect juveniles from public scrutiny,
juvenile adjudications were closed to the public.47 Additionally, juvenile
records were closed or expunged, and juveniles subject to adjudication were
not saddled with a criminal record.48 Finally, when juveniles were sanctioned,
they were sent to institutions that kept them separate from adult offenders.49
This policy was meant to keep juveniles with a high probability of
rehabilitation from being corrupted by hardened adult criminals.50 These
protections remain largely intact in modern juvenile justice systems across the
nation.
The rehabilitative model changed the language used to talk about
juvenile offenders and the length of their punishments.51 Juvenile offenders
were not criminals who committed crimes, but delinquents who committed
acts of delinquency.52 The model also affected the range of punishment
children might receive when compared to adult sanctions for similar conduct.
Further, because the system focused on rehabilitation, punishment was either
more or less severe than an adult offender might have received for the same
offense in the adult justice system. This is because the rehabilitative model
of juvenile courts relied heavily on the characteristics of the juvenile, largely
unlike the adult criminal system.53 Juvenile courts also generally lost
jurisdiction over juveniles when they reached the age of majority, meaning
the length of their punishments was based heavily on their age.54
For example, a juvenile offender who committed a property offense at
the age of twelve might be placed in a juvenile center until he “phased out,”
or reached an age beyond the juvenile court’s jurisdiction, less than a decade
later. An adult who commits the same property offense might only receive a
few days’ jail time. Meanwhile, an adult who was sentenced for a violent
crime might be confined in prison for decades, but a juvenile found delinquent
for the same crime would phase out at the same time as his juvenile
counterpart who committed the property crime.55
45. ABRAMS ET AL., supra note 26, at 940.
46. Id. at 942–43. This was a widely debated topic throughout the twentieth
century. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 944.
49. Id. at 945.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 940.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. A similar hypothetical can be found in ABRAMS et al., supra note 26, at 941.
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The rehabilitative model proved difficult to maintain, due in part to the
resources needed to provide juvenile delinquents with individualized
treatment and the growing national interest in tempering rising rates of
juvenile delinquency.56 The rehabilitative model and the juvenile justice
system began to face new challenges in the 1950s and 1960s.

2. The Mid-Twentieth Century Creates Cracks in the Rehabilitative
Model
The 1950s and 1960s were a time of increasing panic over children
committing crimes, prompted in part by the rising delinquency rates of the
previous two decades.57 According to Federal Bureau of Investigation
statistics from the era, juvenile court cases increased 220% between 1941 and
1957.58 Public concern over juvenile crime reached an all-time high as the
media declared, “Today’s delinquents kill.”59 Even courts were concerned
about the growing rates of delinquency, as demonstrated by a Boston juvenile
court judge who proclaimed, “We have the spectacle of an entire city
terrorized by one-half of one-percent of its residents. And the terrorists are
children.”60
In response to the growing public fear, Congress began to take a special
interest in the problem of juvenile delinquency. In 1953, the United States
Senate Committee to Investigate Juvenile Delinquency was created and
represented the growing congressional fear about the dangers of juvenile
delinquency.61 Congress remained entrenched in dialogue over juvenile
delinquency until the 1960s.62 In 1960, Congress created a national
delinquency task force.63 In 1961, it passed the Juvenile Delinquency and

56. O’Connor & Treat, supra note 30, at 1303.
57. ABRAMS et al., supra note 26, at 932–46. The Children’s Bureau explained
the rise in delinquency rates during World War II by stating juveniles were turning to
a life of crime because they were left unsupervised by fathers who were overseas
fighting in the war and by mothers who were forced to work to provide for both their
families and wartime needs. Id.
58. Jason Barnosky, The Violent Years: Responses to Juvenile Crime in the
1950s, 38 POLITY 314, 320 (2006).
59. All Our Children, NEWSWEEK Nov. 9, 1953, at 28–30; see also Barnosky,
supra note 58, at 322.
60. All Our Children, supra note 59, at 28–30; see also Barnosky, supra note 58,
at 322.
61. ABRAMS et al., supra note 26, at 932–46. The Committee held televised
hearings in 1955 at the behest of Senator Estes Kefauver from Tennessee. At these
hearings, the Children’s Bureau reported the United States would have 40% more
juveniles by 1960 because of the increase in births post-World War II (a phenomenon
now known as “baby boomers”). Id. at 933–34.
62. Id. at 934.
63. Id. at 932–46.
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Youth Offense Control Act.64 The 1968 Presidential campaigns frequently
discussed delinquency prevention.65
As Congress sought to pass legislation to address juvenile delinquency,
the rehabilitative model of the juvenile system began to seem untenable. Due
to the rising number of juvenile delinquents, the juvenile court system became
overburdened.66 The system lacked the resources to effectively provide
individualized, rehabilitative treatment as initially intended.67 Juveniles
would stay in treatment facilities for periods ranging from weeks to years,
often with no follow-up treatment or guidance to prevent recidivism.68
Juvenile courts became a place where delinquents were abandoned without
the necessary resources or many constitutional protections of the adult
criminal justice system.
In the late 1960s, the United States Supreme Court stepped in to provide
juveniles with more traditional criminal due process rights. First, in Kent v.
United States,69 the Court decided juvenile courts can waive jurisdiction over
a juvenile but only after a full investigation based on the individual
characteristics of the juvenile offender.70 Kent also ruled juvenile courts
seeking to waive jurisdiction over a juvenile must provide the juvenile with a
hearing, a statement of reasons for denial, and effective assistance of
counsel.71 Second, in In re Gault,72 the Court held “neither the Fourteenth
Amendment nor the Bill of Rights is for adults alone.”73 Gault extended to
juveniles the right to notice of charges, counsel, confrontation and crossexamination of witnesses, and the privilege against compulsory selfincrimination.74 Third, In re Winship held the standard of proof for
delinquency cases is proving the act of delinquency “beyond a reasonable
doubt.”75 These protections all sought to create a balance between providing
an informal procedure juveniles can understand while providing them
constitutional protections to safeguard their rights within that system. In
1971, however, some Justices on the Court expressed ambivalence towards

64. Id. The law had a three-year authorization and was focused on finding new
methods of delinquency prevention and control. The Juvenile Delinquency and Youth
Offenses Control Act, Pub. L. No. 87-274, 75 Stat. 572-574.
65. ABRAMS et al., supra note 26, 934.
66. O’Connor & Treat, supra note 30, at 1303.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 1303–04.
69. 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
70. Id. at 553–54.
71. Id. at 554.
72. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
73. Id. at 13.
74. Id. at 33–57.
75. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 368 (1970). The Court stated, “In sum, the
constitutional safeguard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt is as much required
during the adjudicatory stage of a delinquency proceedings as are those constitutional
safeguards applied in Gault . . . .” Id.

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2020

9

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 85, Iss. 1 [2020], Art. 8

200

MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 85

creating a juvenile justice system that too-closely mimicked the criminal
justice system, and the Court refused to extend the right to a trial by jury to
the juvenile justice system.76

3. The Rise of the Super-Predator and the Fall of the Rehabilitative
Model
While societal concern over juvenile delinquency grew throughout the
1950s and 1960s, it was only a murmur compared to the uproar over juvenile
delinquency in the 1980s and 1990s. In President Bill Clinton’s 1997 State of
the Union address, he declared “a full-scale assault on juvenile crime” while
calling for new legislation focusing on more resources for prosecuting offices,
tougher penalties, and stricter laws to prevent juveniles from accessing guns.77
His remarks reflected the increasing concern regarding juvenile crime in the
late-twentieth century.
In the 1970s, state juvenile systems began moving away from a
rehabilitative model because such programs were deemed expensive, timeconsuming, and ineffective in reducing recidivism rates.78 The rates of crimes
such as homicide and gun possession by juveniles were on the rise.79 This
perception was coupled with the growing public sentiment that juveniles were
simultaneously becoming more systematic and calloused in committing acts
of delinquency.80 These fears were perpetuated by academics, most notably
Professor John DiIulio of Princeton.81 DiIulio coined the phrase “superpredator” to describe “a young juvenile criminal who is so impulsive, so
remorseless that he can kill, rape, maim, without giving a second thought.”82
Popular news media latched onto this inflated sense of fear to warn the public
76. See In re Gault 387 U.S. 1, 76–77 (1967) (J. Harlan, dissenting); McKeiver
v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 545 (1971).
77. President Clinton’s Message to Congress on the State of the Union, THE N.Y.
TIMES (Feb. 5, 1997) https://www.nytimes.com/1997/02/05/us/president-clinton-smessage-to-congress-on-the-state-of-the-union.html [perma.cc/5QR3-UL7T].
78. O’Connor & Treat, supra note 30, at 1307.
79. A report released by the office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency
Prevention (“OJJDP”) in 1996 states, “The juvenile violent crime arrest rate remained
relatively constant from the early 1970’s to the late 1980’s, increased 64% between
1988 and 1994, and dropped 12% from 1994 to 1996. Similarly, the number of
juveniles arrested for murder more than doubled between the mid-1980’s and the peak
in 1993, representing a percentage change far greater than the increase in adult murder
arrests.” OFF. OF JUV. JUST. AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, STATE LEGISLATIVE
RESPONSES TO VIOLENT JUVENILE CRIME: 1996-97 UPDATE (1998), available at
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles/172835.pdf [perma.cc/BAD3-LWJ2].
80. Priyanka Boghani, They Were Sentenced as “Superpredators.” Who Were
They Really? PBS FRONTLINE (May 2, 2017) https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/arti
cle/they-were-sentenced-as-superpredators-who-were-they-really/ [perma.cc/G7R7EMCS].
81. See id.
82. Id.
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that juveniles represented a growing threat to the safety of communities across
the nation.83
Legislators responded to growing public alarm by passing legislation
designed to toughen the consequences of juvenile delinquency.84 New
legislation focused on incapacitation rather than rehabilitation; its goal was to
prevent the juvenile offenders from committing offenses by restricting their
freedom through confinement.85 Nearly every state passed legislation
allowing certain juveniles to be transferred to the criminal courts for trial and
sentencing.86 During this time, hundreds of juveniles were sentenced to life
imprisonment.87
Fears about juvenile “super-predators” proved misplaced. In 2015, the
Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention reported the juvenile
arrest rate for all offenses peaked in 1996 and then declined sixty-five percent
by 2014.88 A “juvenile violence epidemic” never occurred.89
Concern about juvenile delinquency waned in the late 1990s and the
early twenty-first century as juvenile arrest rates fell, state budgets declined
nationwide, and scientific research shed new light on adolescent

83. See generally, Nina J. Easton, The Crime Doctor is In But Not Everyone Likes
Prof. John DiIulio’s Message: There is No Big Fix, L.A. TIMES (May 2, 1995),
https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1995-05-02-ls-61478-story.html
[perma.cc/XV74-R5M3]; John J. DiIulio, Jr., The Coming of the Super-Predators,
WASH. EXAMINER (Nov. 27, 1995), https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/weeklystandard/the-coming-of-the-super-predators
[perma.cc/RN9R-SEGE];
Lori
Montgomery, ‘Super-Predator’ – Or Just a Kid With a Gun? Skyrocketing Number of
Teen Killers Brings Debate on Causes, SEATTLE TIMES (May 30, 1996),
http://community.seattletimes.nwsource.com/archive/?date=19960530&slug=23319
69 [perma.cc/738R-6934].
84. See e.g., STATE LEGISLATIVE RESPONSES TO VIOLENT JUVENILE CRIME:
1996–97 UPDATE, supra note 79.
85. O’Connor & Treat, supra note 30, at 1307–08.
86. Jesenia M. Pizarro, Steven M. Chermak & Jeffrey A. Gruenewald, Juvenile
‘Super-Predators’ in the News: A Comparison of Adult and Juvenile Homicide, 14 J.
CRIM. JUST. AND POP. CULT. 84, 85 (2007); Clyde Haberman, When Youth Violence
Spurred ‘Superpredator’ Fear, THE N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 6, 2014),
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/07/us/politics/killing-on-bus-recallssuperpredator-threat-of-90s.html [perma.cc/5ENN-7E9X].
87. Haberman, supra note 86.
88. UNITED STATES DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE AND
DELINQUENCY PREVENTION STATISTICAL BRIEFING BOOK, JUVENILE ARREST RATES
FOR ALL CRIMES, 1980–2014 (2015), available at https://www.ojjdp.gov/ojstatbb/cri
me/JAR_Display.asp?ID=qa05201 [perma.cc/WGC7-PV5Y].
89. JAMES C. HOWELL, PREVENTING AND REDUCING JUVENILE DELINQUENCY: A
COMPREHENSIVE FRAMEWORK 16 (2008), available at https://www.sagepub.com/sites
/default/files/upm-binaries/27206_1.pdf [perma.cc/E9H2-9AF6]; David Westphal,
Youth Crime Plunge Shoots Down Scare: Trend Refutes Predictions of ‘SuperPredator’; Experts Are Divided Over Reason for Turnaround, PITTSBURG POSTGAZETTE, Dec. 13, 1999, at A-13.
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development.90 The public became less accepting of policies and sentencing
procedures that ignored maturity and age.91 By 2014, public opinion seemed
to favor juvenile justice policies with a renewed focus on rehabilitation.92 At
the same time, juvenile offenders placed in residential facilities declined fiftyfour percent for all offenses between 1997 and 2015.93 State legislatures
began to soften some “tough on crime” reforms passed in the 1990s.94 For
example, between 2011 and 2013, Missouri made several significant reforms
to its juvenile justice system.95 First, Missouri narrowed its transfer and
waiver criteria, giving juvenile courts more options to address juvenile
delinquency.96 Missouri also rolled back its “once an adult, always an adult”
law that mandated juveniles who had been transferred to adult courts once
would never be allowed in juvenile court again.97
As a result of changing public attitudes towards juvenile justice over
several decades, the contemporary juvenile justice system has become
fragmented and often overburdened. For example, in 2014, juvenile courts
handled an estimated 975,000 delinquency cases or approximately 2700 cases
per day.98 This means delinquency “hearings” sometimes amount to no more
than ten-to-fifteen-minute interviews between the judge and the juvenile
because judges are unable to devote any time beyond that to individual
cases.99 Meanwhile, many juvenile residential facilities across the nation have
been havens for scandal, violence, and abuse.100

90. ABRAMS et al., supra note 26, 935.
91. Id.
92. Public Opinion on Juvenile Justice in America, PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS
(2014), available at https://www.pewtrusts.org/-/media/assets/2015/08/pspp_juvenile
_poll_web.pdf [perma.cc/5NEB-X5FR]. For example, 75% of poll respondents
indicated a preference to “getting juvenile offenders the treatment, counseling, and
supervision they need to make it less likely they will commit another crime, even if
that means they spend no time in a juvenile corrections facility,” over an option that
favors juvenile offenders receiving serious punishment for their offenses. Id.
93. UNITED STATES DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE FOR JUVENILE JUSTICE AND
DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, JUVENILES IN RESIDENTIAL PLACEMENT, 2015 (2018).
94. See, e.g., NAT’L CONF. OF S. LEGISLATURES, TRENDS IN JUVENILE JUSTICE
STATE LEGISLATION 2011-2015 (2015); PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, HAWAII’S 2014
JUVENILE JUSTICE REFORM (2014); IL. JUVENILE JUSTICE COMM’N., BURDENED FOR
LIFE: THE MYTH OF JUVENILE RECORD CONFIDENTIALITY AND EXPUNGEMENT IN
ILLINOIS (2016).
95. TRENDS IN JUVENILE JUSTICE STATE LEGISLATION 2011–2015, supra note 94.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. SARAH HOCKENBERRY & CHARLES PUZZANCHERA, NAT’L CTR. FOR JUV.
JUST.,
JUVENILE
COURT
STATISTICS
2014,
at
6
(2017),
http://www.ncjj.org/pdf/jcsreports/jcs2014.pdf [perma.cc/4GFQ-CHEQ].
99. ABRAMS et al., supra note 26, 935.
100. See e.g., RICHARD A. MENDEL, ANNIE E. CASEY FOUND., MALTREATMENT OF
YOUTH IN U.S. JUVENILE CORRECTIONS FACILITIES 3 (2015); Emily Ramshaw, Sexual
Abuse in State Lock-ups, TEX. TRIBUNE (Jan. 7, 2010), https://www.texastribune.org/
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The evolution of the juvenile justice system over time demonstrates a
national struggle to balance the perceived innocence of children with the
shock of their sometimes-horrific wrongdoing. Missouri’s juvenile justice
system has not been immune to these challenges. Despite this, the
contemporary Missouri juvenile system is one of the foremost juvenile
systems in the nation. Since the late twentieth-century, Missouri has been a
model juvenile system, and its focus on individualized rehabilitation for its
juveniles has been dubbed the “Missouri Miracle.”

B. The Missouri Miracle: How Missouri’s Juvenile System Became a
National Model
Like most states, Missouri housed juveniles in centralized, prison-like
conditions between the late-nineteenth and late-twentieth centuries. In 1889,
Missouri constructed two reform schools to house delinquent children, with a
third being built several years later.101 Missouri Governor Alexander Dockery
signed legislation establishing juvenile courts in the City of St. Louis and
Jackson County on March 23, 1903, just four years after Cook County, Illinois
established the first juvenile court in the nation.102 By the time these courts
were established, the reform schools were not educational havens so much as
“warehouses” to hold children.103 Despite the establishment of separate
juvenile courts, Missouri did not immediately change how it housed
delinquent juveniles. Conditions in the reform schools remained deplorable
throughout the twentieth century because the schools held abuse and neglect
victims with juveniles who committed serious, violent offenses.104 This
system of confining children together regardless of the reason the juvenile was
placed in the reform school led to widespread problems. Physical and
emotional abuse by both other juveniles and guards, suicide, and escapes were
2010/01/07/15-of-tx-youth-offenders-forced-into-sex-acts/ [perma.cc/P47H-97YP];
‘Kids for Cash’ Captures A Juvenile Justice Scandal From Two Sides, NAT’L PUB.
RADIO (Mar. 8, 2014), https://www.npr.org/2014/03/08/287286626/kids-for-cashcaptures-a-juvenile-justice-scandal-from-two-sides [perma.cc/YNL9-RFKZ]; Nancy
Phillips & Chris Palmer, Death, Rapes, and Broken Bones at Philly’s Only Residential
Treatment Center for Troubled Youth, INQUIRER (Apr. 22, 2017),
https://www.inquirer.com/philly/news/pennsylvania/philadelphia/Death-rapePhiladelphia-Wordsworth-residential-treatment-center-troubled-youth.html
[perma.cc/AZQ6-85Y8]; David Jackson, Gary Marx, & Duaa Eldeib, Children
Attacked, Abused at Taxpayer-Funded Living Centers, CHICAGO TRIBUNE (Dec. 3,
2014),
https://www.chicagotribune.com/investigations/ct-youth-treatment-crisisnew-met-20141203-story.html [perma.cc/A2EY-QNYS].
101. Abrams, supra note 27, at 13.
102. JAMES D. REED, MO. JUVENILE JUSTICE ASS’N, CELEBRATING 100 YEARS OF
JUVENILE JUSTICE IN MISSOURI 1903–2003 (2003).
103. Abrams, supra note 27, at 13. The three reform schools were the Missouri
Reform School for Boys in Boonville, the State Industrial Home for Girls in
Chillicothe, and the State Industrial School for Negro Girls in Tipton. Id.
104. Id.
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all commonplace in the reform schools.105 In 1950, social worker Albert
Deutsch characterized the Boonville school as a “hellhole” with a “longstanding tradition of sadistic maltreatment.”106
In 1974, Missouri created the Division of Youth Services (“Missouri
DYS”) within the Department of Social Services.107 The new agency oversaw
the care and treatment of vulnerable juveniles committed to it by the state’s
juvenile or family courts.108 By the 1980s, Missouri DYS found the violence
and indignity of the Missouri reform schools was severely harming vulnerable
juveniles. As a result, the State closed the Chillicothe girls’ school in 1981
and the Boonville boys’ school in 1983.109 While the rest of the nation
focused its attention on get-tough measures to address the growing concerns
over violent juvenile crime,110 Missouri initiated a change focused on
restoring and rehabilitating vulnerable youth. A fifteen-member advisory
board focused on developing a new juvenile policy that was rehabilitative and
therapeutic rather than punitive and confining.111 Throughout the 1980s,
Missouri DYS replaced the reform schools with small, regional facilities that
kept children close to their homes and families.112
Today, Missouri DYS has divided the state into five regions, operates
thirty residential facilities, and works closely with Missouri’s forty-five
juvenile courts.113 During the 2017 fiscal year, Missouri DYS received 621
new youth commitments with an average age of fifteen years old.114 That
same year, its residential facilities served 1535 juveniles. Delinquents are
committed to Missouri DYS when the juvenile court determines there is no
community-based service suitable for the juvenile.115 Missouri DYS retains
jurisdiction over any juvenile in its care until his or her eighteenth birthday,
although under special circumstances Missouri DYS can retain jurisdiction
until a juvenile’s twenty-first birthday.116 Missouri DYS is authorized by law
to create a wide array of treatment programs, including: maximum security
facilities, moderate care facilities, group homes, day treatment programs,
105. THE MO. YOUTH SERVS. INST., APPROACH FOR POSITIVE JUVENILE JUSTICE
OUTCOMES 9 (2016).
106. Abrams, supra note 27, at 13.
107. Who
We
Are,
THE
MISSOURI
APPROACH,
http://missouriapproach.org/approach/ [perma.cc/YS8H-H9F4] (last visited Dec. 18,
2019).
108. Id.
109. Abrams, supra note 27, at 22.
110. See supra Part II.A.3.
111. Abrams, supra note 27, at 22.
112. Id.
113. Id.; see also About DYS, MISSOURI DEP’T OF SOCIAL SERVS., DIV. OF YOUTH
SERVS., https://dss.mo.gov/dys/about-dys.htm [perma.cc/9RX6-F4HK] (last visited
Dec. 18, 2019).
114. MISSOURI DEP’T OF SOCIAL SERVS., DIV. OF YOUTH SERVS., 2017 ANNUAL
REPORT 26 (2017).
115. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 219.021.1 (2018).
116. Id.
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family foster homes, aftercare services, educational services, and counseling
services.117
Missouri DYS brands itself as “rehabilitative and therapeutic” over
“correctional.”118 Juveniles committed to Missouri DYS are placed in the
least restrictive facilities needed to support their treatment.119 The residential
facilities vary in security level, but all offer a range of services, including:
individual and group treatment, life skills training, community service, family
engagement opportunities, family treatment, and education services.120
Juveniles live in dorm-style rooms, wear their own clothes, and are allowed
to decorate personal spaces.121 Even at the maximum security facilities,
juveniles can play with pets and attend programs like summer basketball
camp.122
Missouri DYS is charged with serving many of Missouri’s most
vulnerable juveniles: many Missouri DYS commitments struggle with
educational and mental disabilities. Of juveniles committed to Missouri DYS,
twenty-six percent receiving educational services in 2017 had an educational
disability; thirty-nine percent of Missouri DYS commitments had a history of
prior mental health treatment; and forty-six percent of juveniles had a history
of prior substance abuse.123
Despite the challenges juveniles carry with them to Missouri DYS, they
are overwhelmingly successful after they are discharged. In 2017, Missouri
DYS reported a “law-abiding rate” – defined as the percentage of juveniles
discharged from DYS who are not recommitted or incarcerated in adult
prisons after three years – of nearly seventy-three percent.124 Missouri DYS
is successful in offering juveniles at their most vulnerable the resources they
need to cope with difficult circumstances. Because of this success, Missouri
DYS is an example for other states looking to revamp their juvenile justice
systems.125
117. § 219.021.7.
118. About
the
Missouri
Approach,
THE MISSOURI APPROACH,
http://missouriapproach.org/approach/ [perma.cc/YS8H-H9F4] (last visited Dec. 18,
2019).
119. Id.
120. Residential Treatment, MISSOURI DEP’T OF SOCIAL SERVS., DIV. OF YOUTH
SERVS., https://dss.mo.gov/dys/residential-treatment.htm [perma.cc/76XH-FZ2Z]
(last visited Dec. 18, 2019).
121. RICHARD A. MENDEL, ANNIE E. CASEY FOUND., THE MISSOURI MODEL:
REINVENTING THE PRACTICE OF REHABILITATING YOUTHFUL OFFENDERS 19 (2015)
122. Jenifer Warren, Spare the Rod, Save the Child, L.A. TIMES (July 1, 2004),
https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2004-jul-01-me-juvie1-story.html
[perma.cc/52L9-6FL6].
123. 2017 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 114, at 26.
124. Id.
125. See e.g., Carol Marbin Miller & Audra D.S. Burch, How NYC and Missouri
Are Reforming Juvenile Justice — Without Razor Wire Fences, MIAMI HERALD (Oct.
10,
2017),
https://www.miamiherald.com/news/special-reports/floridaprisons/article177946631.html; Selena Teji, Bringing the Missouri Model to
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Over time, society’s understanding of juveniles who commit acts of
delinquency has evolved to focus more on rehabilitation and less on
punishment. While early American law punished children as adults,
modernly, children are treated in a completely different setting than adults.
Both policymakers and courts have changed their thinking to reflect the
differences between juveniles and adults. The focus on rehabilitation that led
to the creation of juvenile courts has been expanded by courts and legislatures
through limiting the types of punishments that can be given to juveniles and
by making it harder for juveniles to be addressed by the adult system. The
next Section outlines these legal changes.

III. THE BIRTH OF THE “RAISE THE AGE” MOVEMENT
Both state legislatures and the United States Supreme Court experienced
their own versions of the “Raise the Age” movement. Section A lays the
foundation for the various factors prompting the “Raise the Age” movement.
Section B then illustrates how various states passed their own versions of
“Raise the Age” legislation. Finally, Section C demonstrates how the United
States Supreme Court also “raised the age” for the harshest sentences courts
give out: the death penalty and life without the possibility of parole.

A. The Rise of Neuroscience and the Fall of “Tough on Crime”
Policies
As discussed in Part II, fears over juvenile super-predators prompted an
increase in the number of ways juveniles can end up in the adult criminal
justice system. Nearly forty years later, research on adolescent brain
development and the consequences of confining juvenile offenders in adult
facilities has demonstrated policies aimed at treating juvenile offenders as
adults are ineffective and detrimental to those juveniles’ health and future
opportunities.
First, the “Raise the Age” movement is largely driven by research on
adolescent brain development.126 Research now suggests the brain is not fully
developed until an individual’s mid-twenties, meaning adolescents and young
adults are more likely than persons younger or older to engage in risky and
criminal behavior.127 Recent advancements in developmental science and
neuroscience have posited this increased susceptibility for risky behavior is
likely the result of parts of the adolescent brain developing at different

California, CTR. ON JUV. JUST. AND CRIM. JUST. (Dec. 20, 2010),
http://www.cjcj.org/news/5349 [perma.cc/VX8Y-ZJJ7].
126. Stephanie Tabashneck, “Raise the Age” Legislation: Developmentally
Tailored Justice, 34 AM. BAR ASS’N: CRIM. JUST. 13–17 (Winter 2018).
127. See Laurence Steinberg, Adolescent Brain Science and Juvenile Justice
Policymaking, 23 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 410, 416 (2016).
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paces.128 Essentially, the brain’s sensation-seeking centers develop faster in
adolescence than centers controlling self-regulation.129
During adolescence, brain systems responsible for self-regulation of
appetitive, emotional, and social stimuli are relatively immature.130 The
maturity of these brain systems are positively correlated with impulse
control.131 While these systems remain immature during adolescence, there
is increasing activity in the limbic system responsible for processing
emotional and social information, including risk-assessment and predicting
rewards and punishments of some behaviors.132 In other words, during
adolescence, teenagers experience a “hypersensitivity to emotional content”
while their ability to self-regulate their reactions to those emotions and
accurately predict the consequences of their behavior have not yet fully
developed.133 The developing relationship between these two brain systems,
dubbed the “dual systems model,” makes teenagers particularly susceptible to
high-risk criminal behavior.134
Second, by the early 2000s, it was clear the “tough on crime” policies of
the 1980s and 1990s that often resulted in holding juveniles in adult prisons
had produced serious, long-lasting, negative consequences. Children
sentenced in adult courts and confined in adult prisons face exposure to
extreme violence, abuse, and disease.135 By the time the “Raise the Age”
movement gained traction, a clear solution to keeping juveniles safe was to
remove them from the dangers of adult prisons.
In adult prisons, children are more likely to witness and suffer extreme
violence and abuse.136 Children in adult facilities are twice as likely to be
beaten by a staff member or attacked with a weapon than children placed in
juvenile facilities.137 Juveniles confined in adult facilities are also at the
greatest risk of being sexually abused.138 For example, in 2005, juveniles
made up less than one percent of all adult jail inmates, but they accounted for
twenty-one percent of all victims of inmate-perpetrated sexual violence.139 In
2009, eighty-percent of the 420 boys serving life without the possibility of
parole sentences in Michigan, Illinois, and Missouri reported being sexually

128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.

Id. at 413.
Id. at 413–14.
Id. at 414.
Id.
Id.
Tabashneck, supra note 126, at 16.
Steinberg, supra note 127, at 414; Tabashneck, supra note 126, at 16.
CELIA HARRIS ET AL., HUM. IMPACT PARTNERS, JUVENILE INJUSTICE:
CHARGING YOUTH AS ADULTS IS INEFFECTIVE, BIASED, AND HARMFUL 19 (2017).
136. Id.
137. Id. at 21.
138. Id. at 22.
139. NAT’L PRISON RAPE ELIMINATION COMM’N, NATIONAL PRISON RAPE
ELIMINATION COMMISSION REPORT 155 (2009).
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abused within the first year of their sentences.140 Sexual abuse in prisons is
so pervasive that, in 2003, Congress passed the Prison Rape Elimination Act
(“PREA”) in an attempt to lower rates of sexual violence in adult and juvenile
detention facilities.141 Congress found “[j]uveniles are 5 times more likely to
be sexually assaulted in adult rather than juvenile facilities – often within the
first 48 hours of incarceration.”142 Under PREA, juvenile inmates may not be
held in housing units where they will have “sight, sound, or physical contact”
with adult inmates.143 States must “make best efforts” to avoid placing
juvenile inmates in solitary confinement, but many teenagers are still placed
in isolation for up to twenty-three hours a day, leading to a host of mental and
physical health problems.144
Juveniles held in adult facilities are also more likely to suffer from
disease.145 This is due in part to the conditions of prison life, including
overcrowding, loss of privacy, increase in stress, violence, isolation, and
barriers to accessing healthcare.146 Incarcerated populations are more likely
to suffer from hypertension, asthma, and arthritis.147 Beyond suffering
physical ailments, juveniles serving sentences in adult prisons are also likely
to suffer from at least one psychiatric disorder. In 2015, sixty-six percent of
juveniles addressed by adult courts had one psychiatric disorder and fortythree percent had two or more disorders.148 Juveniles are thirty-six times more
likely to commit suicide in adult prisons than in juvenile facilities.149 This is
especially concerning because between 2002 and 2005, suicide was the
leading cause of death for juveniles detained in state juvenile facilities.150
Research on adolescent brain development and the harmful effects of
holding juveniles in adult facilities has led many states to recognize adult
facilities are dangerous and counterproductive places to house juvenile
offenders. To solve this problem, states began rolling back “get tough on
crime” policies that made it more likely for juveniles to find themselves in
adult prisons. One such reform – “Raise the Age” legislation – protects
juveniles from being tried in adult courts at all.
140. Id. at 156.
141. 34 U.S.C. § 30302 (2018).
142. § 30301(4).
143. 28 C.F.R. § 115.14 (2018). This policy has been mandated since the passage
of the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974. See ABRAMS ET AL.,
supra note 26, at 932–46.
144. See, e.g., Lisa Armstrong, A Teen-Ager in Solitary Confinement, NEW
YORKER (Dec. 4, 2017), https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/a-teen-agerin-solitary-confinement [perma.cc/5UKQ-EUL7].
145. HARRIS ET AL., supra note 135, at 19.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 20.
148. JASON J. WASHBURN ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE OFF. OF JUV. JUST. AND
DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, DETAINED YOUTH PROCESSED IN JUVENILE AND ADULT
COURT: PSYCHIATRIC DISORDERS AND MENTAL HEALTH NEEDS 6–7 (2015).
149. HARRIS ET AL., supra note 135, at 23.
150. Id.
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B. Brief Legislative History of “Raise the Age” Statutes
The year 2019 marked the first time in United States history that sixteenyear-old juveniles were not automatically treated as adults in the criminal
justice system in any state nationwide; a feat accomplished largely through
“Raise the Age” legislation.151 States have been passing “Raise the Age”
legislation for over a decade. In 2007, fourteen states continued to
automatically exclude some juveniles under the age of eighteen from juvenile
court jurisdiction, and approximately 175,000 juveniles were automatically
tried in the adult criminal system.152 In 2019, the number of juveniles
automatically excluded from the juvenile system is expected to fall to between
35,000 and 40,000.153 After the passage of Missouri’s Senate Bill 793, only
four states continue to automatically exclude juveniles from the juvenile
system, and all four of those states have recently considered “Raise the Age”
legislation.154
In 2007, Connecticut passed Senate Bill 1500, which raised the age of
juvenile court jurisdiction from sixteen to eighteen.155
Connecticut
implemented its legislation in stages, and full implementation occurred in
2012.156 Illinois also raised the age in steps; in 2009, Illinois raised the age
for juvenile misdemeanors from seventeen to eighteen.157 When none of the
anticipated negative consequences – i.e., potential rising costs, decreased
public safety, and overburdening the juvenile system – occurred, Illinois
raised the age for juvenile felonies from seventeen to eighteen in 2013.158
Also in 2013, Massachusetts raised the age of juvenile court jurisdiction from
seventeen to eighteen.159 In 2014, New Hampshire followed suit with the
passage of House Bill 1624.160 Louisiana and South Carolina both raised the
age in 2016.161 New York and North Carolina became the last states before
the passage of Missouri Senate Bill 793 to pass “Raise the Age” legislation.162

151. JEREE THOMAS, CAMPAIGN FOR YOUTH JUSTICE, RAISING THE BAR: STATE
TRENDS IN KEEPING YOUTH OUT OF ADULT COURTS (2015–2017), at 3 (2017).
152. Id.
153. Id. at 10.
154. Those states are Texas, Michigan, Georgia, and Wisconsin. Tabashneck,
supra note 126, at 18–19; THOMAS, supra note 151, at 8.
155. See S. 1500, 2007 Gen. Assemb., Spec. Sess. (Conn. 2007).
156. Id.
157. S. 2275, 95th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2009).
158. H.R. 2404, 98th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2013).
159. H.B. 1432, 188th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Mass. 2013).
160. H.B. 1624, 2014 Reg. Sess. (N.H. 2014).
161. S.B. 324, 2016 Reg. Sess. (La. 2016); S.B. 916, 121st Gen. Assemb., Reg.
Sess. (S.C. 2016).
162. Jesse McKinley, ‘Raise the Age,’ Now Law in New York, Is Still a Subject of
Debate, THE N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 10, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/10/nyre
gion/raise-the-age-new-york.html [perma.cc/3X9Y-88WX]; S.B. 257, 2017 Gen.
Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 2017).
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Congress has also considered legislation to incentivize states to “raise
the age.” Senators Rand Paul (R-Ky.) and Cory Booker (D-N.J.) offered the
Record Expungement Designed to Enhance Employment (“REDEEM”) Act
in 2013,163 2015,164 and 2017.165 The REDEEM Act would offer states who
pass “Raise the Age” legislation priority when applying for federal grants
through the Community Oriented Policing Services (“COPS”) program.166
Despite bipartisan support, the bill has failed to make it out of committee.167
Even without REDEEM Act incentives, states continue to consider
legislation to “raise the age” even beyond the age of eighteen. In 2016,
Vermont became the first state in the nation to pass legislation that raises the
age of juvenile court jurisdiction beyond age eighteen, to twenty-one.168
Several more states are now considering the same.169 In 2017, Massachusetts
state legislators considered Senate Bill 947, which would raise the age of
juvenile court jurisdiction to twenty-one years old.170 Further, Connecticut’s
“Raise the Age” legislation has been so successful in its implementation – by
lowering recidivism rates,171 saving state funds,172 and maintaining the
juvenile system’s caseload173 – that Connecticut’s then-Governor Dannel
Malloy offered legislation in 2018 to raise the age of juvenile court
jurisdiction to twenty-one.174
The overwhelmingly positive trend in the passage of “Raise the Age”
legislation suggests it is only a matter of time before every state automatically
handles juveniles under the age of eighteen within the juvenile justice system.
The “Raise the Age” trend is not confined to legislatures: the United States

163. S. 2567, 113th Cong. (2013).
164. S. 675, 114th Cong. (2015).
165. S. 827, 115th Cong. (2017).
166. Tabashneck, supra note 126, at 19; Ed O’Keefe, Cory Booker, Rand Paul
Team Up on Sentencing Reform Bill, WASH. POST (July 8, 2014),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/2014/07/08/cory-bookerrand-paul-team-up-on-sentencing-reformbill/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.9f2d474dd906 [perma.cc/6AAU-9YJB].
167. Tabashneck, supra note 126, at 19.
168. H.B. 95, 2016 Gen. Assemb, Reg. Sess. (Vt. 2016).
169. THOMAS, supra note 151, at 19; see also Katie Lannan, Mass. Watching as
Vermont Pulls Teenagers into Family Court, DAILY NEWS (July 4, 2018),
https://www.newburyportnews.com/news/regional_news/mass-watching-asvermont-pulls-teenagers-into-family-court/article_750e7535-0a00-5081-aab612e29d5a166d.html [perma.cc/T9QU-UDYD].
170. S.B. 947, 190th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Mass. 2017).
171. JUV. JUST. INST., RAISING THE AGE: SHIFTING TO A SAFER AND MORE
EFFECTIVE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM 40 (2017).
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Rich Scinto, Malloy Pushes to ‘Raise the Age’ to 21 for Many Crimes, PATCH
(Mar. 20, 2018), https://patch.com/connecticut/ridgefield/malloy-pushes-raise-age21-many-crimes [perma.cc/VKA3-A5WT].
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Supreme Court has also recently “raised the age” for the harshest forms of
punishment.

C. The United States Supreme Court “Raises the Age” for Severe
Punishments
This Section focuses on several key United States Supreme Court
decisions on the constitutionality of two types of punishment for juvenile
offenders: the death penalty and life imprisonment without the possibility of
parole (“LWOP”). The Court’s decisions have largely reflected the overall
social attitude of the times. In the late twentieth century, as fear over juvenile
“super-predators” grew, the Court ruled the juvenile death penalty was
constitutional. By the 2010s, when the legislative “Raise the Age” movement
was gaining traction, the Court barred both capital punishment of juveniles
and mandatory LWOP sentences for juvenile offenders. As the next Section
illustrates, the same arguments in favor of “raising the age” of juvenile court
jurisdictions – the neuroscience of juvenile brains and their incompatibility
with adult prisons – also shaped the Justices’ thinking on juveniles’ eligibility
for certain punishments.175

1. The Death of the Juvenile Death Penalty
In the 1970s, as the juvenile justice system was walking back the
rehabilitative model of addressing juvenile delinquency, the death penalty
became a hotly debated topic.176 The United States Supreme Court decided
numerous death penalty cases, including cases involving the constitutionality
of executing persons who were juveniles when they committed their capital
crimes. Between 1973 and 2005, the United States executed twenty-two
juveniles.177 In the 1980s, the United States Supreme Court set an age limit
on the use of the death penalty, but the execution of anyone under the age of
175. Notably, the Court is posed to decide another case regarding juvenile
sentencing in the adult system. On March 18, 2019, the United States Supreme Court
granted a writ for certiorari in Mathena v. Malvo, 139 S. Ct. 1317 (2019) (Mem.). The
issue in that case was whether the Court’s holdings in Miller and Montgomery apply
regardless of whether a state characterizes its sentencing scheme as “mandatory” or
“discretionary.” Respondent’s Brief at 19, Mathena v. Malvo, 139 S. Ct. 1317 (2019)
(No. 18-217).
176. See generally Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972); Gregg v. Georgia,
428 U.S. 153, 188 (1976); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976); Roberts
v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976).
177. VICTOR L. STREIB, THE JUVENILE DEATH PENALTY TODAY: DEATH
SENTENCES AND EXECUTIONS FOR JUVENILE CRIMES, JANUARY 1, 1973 – FEBRUARY
28, 2005, at 3 (2005), available at http://www2.law.columbia.edu/fagan/courses/law_
socialscience/juvenile_justice/documents/Streib_JuvDeathMar2004.pdf
[perma.cc/2X3F-EUQQ]. Between 1973 and 2005, Missouri sentenced four juvenile
offenders to death and ranked fourteen out of twenty-three states that allowed the
execution of juveniles. Id. at 10.
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eighteen at the time of their crime was not declared unconstitutional until
2005.
The United States Supreme Court did not bar the execution of persons
because of their youth until 1988.178 In Thompson v. Oklahoma, the Court
held that executing juveniles for capital crimes they committed while fifteenyears old or younger violated the Eighth Amendment’s bar against “cruel and
unusual” punishment.179 The Court, in a plurality opinion, found fifteen-year
old juveniles are “less mature and responsible than adults.”180 The plurality
concluded, “Given the lesser culpability of the juvenile offender, the
teenager’s capacity for growth, and society’s fiduciary obligation to its
children, this conclusion is simply inapplicable to the execution of a [fifteenyear-old] offender.”181
The Court drew a bright line in Thompson: juveniles fifteen-years old or
younger are categorically less culpable than adults and thus cannot be
executed by the state for their crimes. But the Court was hesitant to apply this
reasoning to all juveniles under the age of majority. Just one year after the
decision in Thompson, the Court refused to extend its reasoning to juveniles
older than fifteen in Stanford v. Kentucky.182 The plurality, led by Justice
Antonin G. Scalia, was unpersuaded by new scientific evidence indicating
adolescent brains struggle to grasp the consequences of homicidal actions.183
Ultimately, the plurality allowed age to be considered only as a mitigating
factor rather than as a complete bar to the death penalty for juveniles for acts
they committed when they were older than fifteen.184
States continued to execute juveniles older than fifteen until 2005. In
fact, eighteen of the twenty-two juveniles executed between 1973 and 2005
were executed after the Stanford decision.185 The last juvenile executed in the
United States was Scott Hain, who was executed by Oklahoma in 2003 for a
crime he committed at age seventeen.186 The tide began to turn in 2002, when
the United States Supreme Court ruled in Atkins v. Virginia executions of
persons with intellectual disabilities violates the Eighth Amendment.187 The
Court reasoned persons with intellectual disabilities have a diminished
personal culpability because they are less able to understand and process
information, learn from mistakes and experiences, engage in logical
reasoning, control impulses, and understand the reactions of others.188 The

178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.

Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 838 (1988).
Id. at 815.
Id. at 834.
Id. at 836–37.
Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 380 (1989).
Id. at 378.
Id. at 375.
STREIB, supra note 177, at 4.
Id. at 4.
Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002).
Id. at 318.
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Court stated persons with intellectual disabilities are not exempt from criminal
sanctions but cannot be given the death penalty.189
In 2003, the Missouri Supreme Court applied the Court’s reasoning in
Atkins to the execution of a seventeen-year-old in State ex rel. Simmons v.
Roper.190 In Simmons, the Missouri Supreme Court held juveniles have a
diminished personal culpability for all of the same reasons Atkins held those
with intellectual disabilities are less personally culpable.191 The Missouri
Supreme Court reasoned: (1) legislative action has consistently opposed the
juvenile death penalty;192 (2) juries infrequently impose the death penalty for
juveniles;193 and (3) a national and international consensus exists among
professional, social, and religious organizations against the juvenile death
penalty.194
The United States Supreme Court affirmed the Missouri Supreme
Court’s application of Atkins to juveniles.195 The Court stated the death
penalty is available only to those offenders with “extreme culpability.”196
Importantly, for the first time, the United States Supreme Court recognized
juveniles are fundamentally different from – and should not be classified
among – the worst offenders for three reasons.197 First, juveniles lack maturity
and a sense of responsibility.198 Second, juveniles are the most susceptible to
negative influences and peer pressure.199 Third and finally, juveniles have a
character “not as well formed as that of an adult.”200 The Court reasoned these
fundamental differences make it impossible for judges and juries to
consistently and accurately determine which juveniles acted with the
appropriate culpability to receive a death sentence and which juveniles acted
based on their youth.201
189. Id.
190. State ex rel. Simmons v. Roper, 112 S.W.3d 397, 399 (Mo. 2003). Notably,
Christopher Simmons told his accomplices before they committed the murder they
would “get away with it” because they were juveniles. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S.
551, 556 (2005).
191. Roper, 112 S.W.3d at 399.
192. Id. at 407.
193. Id. at 409.
194. Id. at 410. The Missouri Supreme Court also concluded the juvenile death
penalty was unconstitutional “cruel and unusual” punishment barred by the Eighth
Amendment after conducting its own independent analysis. Id. at 411.
195. Roper, 543 U.S. at 554.
196. Id. at 568.
197. Id. at 569.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 572–73. “An unacceptable likelihood exists that the brutality or cold–
blooded nature of any particular crime would overpower mitigating arguments based
on youth as a matter of course, even where the juvenile offender’s objective
immaturity, vulnerability, and lack of truth depravity should require a sentence less
severe than death.” Id. at 573.
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Roper was the first time the Court recognized the scientific and social
differences separating youth from adulthood; those same scientific and social
differences fueled the passage of “Raise the Age” statutes just a few years
later.202 In the decade that followed the Roper decision, the landscape for
sentencing juvenile offenders who commit serious offenses changed
drastically.203 The United States Supreme Court has “raised the age” of
offenders eligible for mandatory LWOP sentences. Today, only those aged
eighteen and above can automatically be sentenced to LWOP for both
homicide and non-homicide offenses.

2. The Cruel and Unusual Punishment of LWOP for Juvenile
Offenders
In Graham v. Florida,204 the Court used its reasoning from Roper to rule
the Eighth Amendment bars a LWOP sentence for juvenile offenders who
commit non-homicide offenses.205 The Court restated a tenet of Roper:
juveniles have diminished culpability and are thus less deserving of the most
severe punishments.206 Further, the Court noted defendants who do not kill,
intend to kill, or foresee any loss of life are also categorically less deserving
of the severest forms of punishment.207 Thus, the Court concluded juveniles
who commit non-homicide offenses have “a twice diminished moral
culpability.”208 This diminished culpability coupled with the acute harshness
of a LWOP sentence for juveniles – they spend more years and a greater
percentage of their lives in prison compared to adult offenders – prompted the
Court to hold such mandatory LWOP sentences are “cruel and unusual”
punishment barred by the Eighth Amendment.209 The Court conceded states
are not required to guarantee release to all juvenile offenders convicted of
non-homicide crimes but nonetheless must give such juvenile offenders
“some meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated
maturity and rehabilitation.”210 In sum, after the Court’s decision in Graham,
juveniles can no longer receive LWOP sentences for non-homicide

202. See THOMAS, supra note 151, at 19.
203. See, e.g., Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010) (prohibiting life without
parole for juveniles who committed non-homicide offenses); Miller v. Alabama, 567
U.S. 460 (2012) (expanding Graham to juveniles who committed homicides);
Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718 (2016) (ruling the decision in Miller applied
retroactively).
204. 560 U.S. 48 (2010).
205. Id. at 68.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 69.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 70–71.
210. Id. at 75.
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offenses,211 and states must give juveniles with such sentences for nonhomicide offenses “meaningful opportunity” for release.212
Just two years later in Miller v. Alabama,213 the Court extended Graham
to homicide cases and held mandatory LWOP sentences for offenders under
the age of eighteen violated the Eighth Amendment.214 The Court held
juveniles who commit criminal acts cannot automatically be given a LWOP
sentence because they have a diminished moral culpability and “greater
prospects for reform.”215 After this decision, before sentencing a juvenile to
LWOP, the judge or jury must take into account the juvenile’s age.216 The
Court stated the judge or jury must consider “hallmark features” of age such
as “immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to appreciate risks and
consequences,” as well as the juvenile’s home environment, level of
participation in the criminal conduct, the possibility of peer or familial
pressures, and the juvenile’s ability to navigate the adult criminal justice
system.217 Most importantly, the Court requires judges sentencing juveniles
to consider the juvenile’s capacity for rehabilitation.218 After this decision,
juveniles facing LWOP sentences may present their age and all associated
mitigating evidence at their sentencing. In 2016, the Court extended its
holding in Miller to afford juveniles sentenced pre-Miller a re-sentencing or
parole hearing.219
The Court’s recent decisions reflect the same change in thinking that led
state legislatures to create “Raise the Age” legislation. The United States
Supreme Court decisions discussed above conclude juveniles should be
sentenced differently than adults for two reasons: (1) juveniles are entitled to
more lenient sentences than adult offenders because of their incomplete brain
development; and (2) time allows juvenile brains to develop and thus reduces
the need for punitive intervention to accomplish reform.220 The passage of
Missouri Senate Bill 793 indicates Missouri is joining other states and the
United States Supreme Court in recognizing the inherent differences in
juveniles that require they be treated differently for their acts of delinquency.
The next Section explores Missouri Senate Bill 793 in detail by examining the
new law’s benefit to both Missouri juveniles and Missouri communities.

211. Id. at 74–75.
212. Id. at 75.
213. 567 U.S. 460 (2012).
214. Id. at 470.
215. Id. at 471.
216. Id. at 477.
217. Id. at 477–78.
218. Id. at 478.
219. See Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 736 (2016).
220. Susan Frelich Appleton, Deanna M. Barch & Anneliese M. Schafer, The
Developing Brain: New Directions in Science, Policy, and Law, 57 WASH. U. J.L. &
POL’Y 1, 2 (2018)
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IV. MISSOURI SENATE BILL 793: PROTECTING MISSOURI’S
JUVENILES
“Raise the Age” legislation was first introduced in the Missouri
legislature in 2015 by Senator Wayne Wallingford.221 That year, it did not
earn a hearing in the Senate’s Judiciary and Civil and Criminal Jurisprudence
Committee.222 Senator Wallingford persisted and introduced the legislation
again in 2016 and 2017.223 However, neither bill made it to a vote in that
Committee. Finally, in 2018, Senator Wallingford was able to send Senate
Bill 793 to the Governor’s desk with widespread support.224 The bill passed
the Senate by a 32-1 vote.225 The bill passed the House 139-4.226 The law
does not go into effect until 2021 and will not be fully implemented until 2027,
giving Missouri DYS time to hire more staff and plan to treat and house
seventeen-year-old juveniles. In 2021, seventeen-year-old juvenile offenders
and Missouri’s communities will begin to reap the benefits of this legislation.

A. Spare the Rod, Save the Child:227 Individual Benefits of “Raise the
Age” Legislation
Senate Bill 793 expands the age of juvenile court jurisdiction to include
eighteen-year-olds.228 Senate Bill 793 protects juveniles from exposure to the
adult criminal system. The benefits to seventeen-year-old juveniles under
Senate Bill 793 are threefold. First, the presumption of juvenile court
jurisdiction exposes them to transfer laws, where they have an opportunity to
plead their case prior to being adjudicated as an adult. Second, juvenile courts
shield juveniles from experiencing the vast collateral consequences that
accompany adult convictions. Third, juvenile courts and Missouri DYS offer
programs and opportunities designed specifically for juvenile rehabilitation.
This Section explores each of these benefits in turn.

221. S.B. 213, 98th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2015).
222. SB 213 Current Bill Summary, MO. SENATE, https://www.senate.mo.gov/15i
nfo/BTS_Web/Bill.aspx?SessionType=R&BillID=901414 [perma.cc/8Q6P-XBKW].
223. See S.B. 685, 98th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2016); S.B. 40, 99th
Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2017).
224. Senate Bill 800, sponsored by Senator Doug Libla, also contained a “Raise
the Age” provision and was signed into law on the same day Senate Bill 793 was
signed. See S.B. 800, 99th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (2018).
225. S. 99th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess., at 1833 (Mo. 2018), available at
https://www.senate.mo.gov/18info/pdf-jrnl/DAY68.pdf#page=44 [perma.cc/3HWPPW65]. Senator Rob Schaaf was the lone nay vote. Id.
226. H. 99th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess., at 2550 (Mo. 2018), available at
https://house.mo.gov/billtracking/bills181/jrnpdf/jrn068.pdf#page=22
[perma.cc/U4PC-3CV3].
227. Warren, supra note 122.
228. S.B. 793, 99th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2018).
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1. “Hear Me:” Allowing Seventeen-Year-Old Offenders to Plead
Their Case
First, under Senate Bill 793, seventeen-year-old juveniles accused of
committing any felony will automatically fall under the exclusive jurisdiction
of juvenile courts rather than being automatically processed through the adult
system.229 However, this change does not mean juveniles cannot be tried in
the adult criminal system. Seventeen-year-old juvenile offenders will
presumptively be treated as children, but after Senate Bill 793 takes full effect
in 2021, seventeen-year-old juvenile offenders will be subjected to adult
criminal courts only after a transfer hearing is held.
Transfer hearings are proceedings where courts decide if children are
treated as adults via legal fiction regardless of their actual age.230 Currently,
any juvenile between twelve and seventeen who has committed an offense
that would be considered a felony if committed by an adult is eligible for
transfer to a court of general jurisdiction.231 For most eligible offenses, the
juvenile court may order a hearing for transfer upon its own motion or a
motion made by a juvenile officer, the child, or the child’s custodian.232 If a
juvenile allegedly commits a “serious violent felony,” a hearing to determine
transfer is automatically held.233
Prior to the hearing, the court reviews a written report outlining the
statutorily-required criteria for transfer is prepared.234 The report considers
characteristics of the offense, including: the seriousness of the offense and
whether transfer serves community safety; whether the alleged offense
involves “viciousness, force, and violence;” and whether the offense was
against persons or property.235 The report also considers the juvenile’s
characteristics, such as: the child’s record and history, including previous
experience with the juvenile justice system; the child’s sophistication and
maturity as determined by consideration of their home, environmental
situation, emotional condition, and pattern of living; the child’s age; programs
and facilities available to the child in the juvenile system; whether the child
can benefit from the treatment and rehabilitative programs of the juvenile
justice system; and racial disparity in certification.236 At the transfer hearing,

229. Id.
230. Jenny E. Carroll, Rethinking the Constitutional Criminal Procedure of
Juvenile Transfer Hearings: Apprendi, Adult Punishment, and Adult Process, 61
HASTINGS L.J. 175, 176 (2009).
231. MO. REV. STAT. § 211.071.1 (2018).
232. Id.
233. Id. The statute defines serious violent felony as first-degree murder, first
degree assault, forcible rape, first degree rape, forcible sodomy, first degree sodomy,
first degree robbery, or has committed two or more prior offenses that would be
felonies if committed by an adult. Id.
234. § 211.071.6.
235. § 211.071.6(1)–(3).
236. § 211.071.6(4)–(10).
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the judge reviews the report and hears arguments from both parties before
deciding whether the juvenile’s case should be adjudicated in the juvenile or
adult system.237
Once Senate Bill 793 takes full effect, all juveniles under the age of
eighteen will be subject to transfer laws. This hearing also gives judges the
chance to consider the best placement for every juvenile, whereas before
seventeen-year-olds were barred simply by their birthdays. These transfer
hearings allow an opportunity for individualized justice at the front end of the
adjudication process. Presuming seventeen-year-old juvenile offenders are
best rehabilitated in juvenile courts and allowing them to plead their case if
anyone thinks otherwise is the smartest approach to addressing their
misbehavior. This approach exposes them to the programming of Missouri
DYS, which is geared towards rehabilitation and skill-building rather than
punishment and confinement.

2. “Help Me:” Avoiding the Collateral Consequences of a Criminal
Conviction
As discussed in Part III, adult prisons are dangerous places to confine
children. This is not the only negative consequence of juveniles being
adjudicated in adult criminal courts. Criminal convictions in adult courts
often carry heavy and permanent burdens known as collateral consequences.
Collateral consequences are “legal disabilities imposed by law as a result of a
criminal conviction . . . .”238 These consequences deny or restrict benefits
typically available to everyone and create social and economic barriers for
those trying to re-enter society after a criminal conviction.239 As many as 110
million Americans have criminal records and thus face collateral
consequences.240 These consequences affect all areas of public life: from
housing and employment opportunities to voting and other civic services.241
Under the current scheme in Missouri, seventeen-year-old juveniles who are
convicted in the adult criminal justice system face these collateral
consequences, some of which are permanent. Senate Bill 798 removes these
juveniles from adult court jurisdiction absent a transfer hearing, meaning these
children will no longer face these collateral consequences.

237. Carroll, supra note 230, at 198.
238. AM. BAR. ASS’N, COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF CRIMINAL CONVICTIONS:
JUDICIAL BENCH BOOK 5 (2018).
239. Id.
240. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, SURVEY OF STATE CRIMINAL HISTORY INFORMATION
SYSTEMS, 2016, at 2 (2018).
241. See generally Michael Pinard & Anthony C. Thompson, Offender Reentry
and the Collateral Consequences of Criminal Convictions: An Introduction, 30
N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 585 (2006); Gabriel J. Chin, Collateral Consequences
and Criminal Justice: Future Policy and Constitutional Directions, 102 MARQ. L.
REV. 233 (2018).
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For example, landlords may deny housing to potential tenants solely
because they have a criminal record, even if they were a juvenile when they
committed the underlying offense.242 The federal government can deny
people access to some social programs solely because of their criminal
record.243 As discussed later in this Note, criminal convictions also lead to a
substantial decrease in earning potential, as those with prior convictions
struggle to find employment and make less money upon finding a job.244
Overall, seventeen-year-old juveniles with prior felony convictions face a
whole host of obstacles affecting every area of their lives that limit their ability
to re-enter society successfully.245 Pulling children back into the juvenile
system shields them from these detrimental and permanent consequences of
the adult system.
Further, persons with felony convictions are often denied the ability to
practice their constitutional rights or engage in civic duties. It is both a state
and federal crime for a felon to possess a firearm, meaning those with felony
convictions are denied their Second Amendment right to bear arms.246 Those
with felony convictions also lose their right to vote, sometimes forever.
Approximately six million potential voters in the United States are barred
from voting because of a prior felony conviction.247 In Missouri, individuals
are disqualified from voting while serving a sentence of imprisonment, while
on probation or parole until they are discharged, and forever disqualified after
a conviction of a felony or misdemeanor related to the right of suffrage.248 In
2016, it was estimated this law prevented 89,665 individuals from

242. In 2016, the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development released
new guidelines under the Fair Labor Standards Act banning landlords from denying
people housing simply because of their past criminal convictions. Office of General
Counsel Guidance on Application of Fair Housing Act Standards to the Use of
Criminal Records by Providers of Housing and Real Estate-Related Transactions,
U.S. DEP’T OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVEL. at 6 (Apr. 4, 2016),
https://www.hud.gov/sites/documents/HUD_OGCGUIDAPPFHASTANDCR.PDF
[perma.cc/RML8-2MX5]. However, the Fair Labor Standards Act has not changed to
include this language, and landlords are still permitted to refuse housing to people who
have been convicted of certain types of offenses. Id. Landlords now must simply
prove why the denial of housing serves a “substantial, legitimate, nondiscriminatory
interest.” Id.
243. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. §862 (2018) (denying federal benefits for those with prior
drug-related offenses).
244. See infra Section IV.B.1.
245. See generally Pinard & Thompson, supra note 241, at 613.
246. See MO. REV. STAT. § 571.070 (2018) (describing the elements of unlawful
possession of a firearm); 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (2018) (describing the elements of the
federal law against unlawful possession of a firearm); U.S. CONST. amend. II.
247. See generally, Christopher Uggen et al., 6 Million Lost Voters: State-Level
Estimates of Felony Disenfranchisement, 2016 THE SENT’G PROJECT 3 (Oct. 6, 2016),
https://www.sentencingproject.org/publications/6-million-lost-voters-state-levelestimates-felony-disenfranchisement-2016/ [perma.cc/U7NN-URD4].
248. MO. REV. STAT. § 115.133 (2018).
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participating in local, state, and federal elections.249 Further, those with felony
records cannot serve on juries.250
In short, a felony conviction does not just result in lost time during
incarceration but extends to affect all areas of a juvenile’s life permanently.
Given that neuroscience has revealed juvenile brains are less able to
appreciate the potentially serious consequences of their behavior, saddling
juveniles with a lifetime of struggles is especially unfair. Senate Bill 793
shields juveniles from both the loss of time in adult incarceration and from the
long-term negative effects collateral consequences have on their lives. For
Missouri’s juveniles, Missouri DYS is a better place for them to be
rehabilitated.

3. “Heal Me:” Using Juvenile Programs to Rehabilitate SeventeenYear-Old Offenders
As discussed in Part II, juvenile courts and juvenile treatment programs
are aimed towards rehabilitating juveniles.251 The juvenile court system
assumes children and their wrongdoings are often products of their
environment. Therefore, in order to properly treat the underlying offense, the
child’s environment needs to improve. Missouri DYS characterizes this idea
as one of their “Treatment Beliefs” by stating, “All behavior has a purpose
and is often a symptom of unmet needs.”252 Under Senate Bill 793, seventeenyear-old juvenile offenders will be able to access Missouri DYS resources
aimed at helping them overcome their pasts and prepare for the future.
Juveniles entering the juvenile justice system often bring with them the
heavy baggage of abuse, neglect, disability, and instability. For example, in
fiscal year 2017, forty-six percent of juveniles committed to Missouri DYS
had a history of prior substance abuse.253 As stated in Part II.C, juveniles
under the care of Missouri DYS often struggle with educational disabilities
and substance abuse and require mental health services. Unlike the Missouri
Department of Corrections, Missouri DYS has programs and treatment
regimens designed specifically to aid juveniles in their recovery. Missouri
DYS services extend to aftercare services and to the juvenile’s familial
support system. In 2021, seventeen-year-old juveniles who likely suffer from
the same rate of disability will have access to Missouri DYS programming.
Missouri DYS offers a variety of services – including individualized
care, day treatment services, residential treatment services, education
services, aftercare services, and family engagement programs – to help
249. Uggen et al., supra note 247, at 15.
250. MO. REV. STAT. § 561.026 (2018) (stating those with felony convictions are
forever disqualified from serving on a jury).
251. See supra, Part II.
252. Missouri DYS Treatment Beliefs, MO. DEP’T SOC. SERVS.,
https://dss.mo.gov/dys/belief.htm [perma.cc/YAN2-WTFT] (last visited Dec. 19,
2019).
253. 2017 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 114, at 1.
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juveniles overcome the struggles they face.254 Missouri DYS also undertakes
an empirically-based risk assessment to create a “Comprehensive Individual
Treatment Plan” for each juvenile in its care.255 These plans are flexible and
are continuously changed as Missouri DYS develops community-based
partnerships for education, treatment, and job placement for its juveniles.
Missouri DYS Director Scott Odum stated that Missouri DYS will work to
develop programming specifically geared towards seventeen-year-old
juveniles in the years leading to 2021.256 For instance, Missouri DYS will
develop programming to release seventeen-year-old juveniles back into
society as adults and will place greater emphasis on developing life skills and
vocational skills.257
In sum, Missouri Senate Bill 793 will place seventeen-year-old juveniles
where they belong beginning in 2021: under the jurisdiction of Missouri DYS
where they can be given a chance at rehabilitation through programs designed
to treat their individualized needs. Seventeen-year-old juveniles are not the
only group that will benefit from Missouri’s “Raise the Age” legislation. The
next Section outlines how Missouri Senate Bill 793 will improve
communities.

B. “It Takes a Village to Raise a Child:” How Raising the Age Helps
Communities
This Section first discusses the benefits of Missouri’s “Raise the Age”
legislation and then explores further reforms to improve the juvenile justice
system in Missouri. First, “Raise the Age” legislation is economically sound
policy; it will save Missouri money by decreasing recidivism rates and will
increase Missouri’s tax revenue in the long run. Second, early intervention
aimed at preventing children from entering the adult criminal justice system
means lower crime rates and safer communities.

1. “You Got to Spend Money to Make Money:” The Economic
Payout of “Raise the Age” Legislation
Senate Bill 793 will decrease costs in Missouri by diverting seventeenyear-old juveniles to Missouri DYS, where recidivism rates are much lower
than the Missouri Department of Corrections. Missouri Senate Bill 793 will
also improve the economic outlook for the seventeen-year-old juveniles
254. Division of Youth Services, MO. DEP’T SOC. SERVS., https://dss.mo.gov/dys/
[perma.cc/66TH-BC7F] (last visited Dec. 19, 2019).
255. Individualized Care, MO. DEP’T SOC. SERVS., https://dss.mo.gov/dys/individ
ualized-care.htm [perma.cc/V7GG-67GW] (last visited Dec. 19, 2019).
256. Telephone Interview with Scott Odum, Director, Missouri Division of Youth
Servs. (Sept. 14, 2018) (Please note at the time of this interview, Mr. Odum was
Deputy Director of Missouri DYS and was named Director during the drafting of this
paper).
257. Id.
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affected and thus will improve the economic power of the state.258 The next
Section outlines these economic benefits by examining cost-savings from
reduced recidivism and, in turn, the increase in spending power for seventeenyear-old juveniles as a result of this bill.
First, Missouri DYS will likely see an increase in expenditures in the
immediate years following Missouri Senate Bill 793’s implementation in
2021. This is largely due to the increase in juveniles falling under Missouri
DYS’s care. In the fiscal note attached to Senate Bill 793, Missouri DYS
estimated approximately 284 juveniles will be transferred from the Missouri
Department of Corrections to Missouri DYS as a result of this bill.259
Missouri DYS estimates a fiscal impact of $1.8 million to develop
programming aimed at seventeen-year-old juveniles and to hire and train
additional staff.260 On the other hand, the Missouri Department of Corrections
expects to see a reduction in costs due to fewer offenders being housed in its
facilities. In 2018, the Missouri Department of Corrections expected to reduce
the prison population by 425 offenders in the year 2021.261 After ten years,
the Missouri Department of Corrections expects to see 1310 less offenders in
its prisons and expects to save $3.8 million as a result of Senate Bill 793.262
Further, to offset the increase in cost for the juvenile system, Senate Bill
793 creates the Juvenile Justice Preservation Fund, which will expire in fiscal
year 2025.263 This fund will generate revenue from two new surcharges added
to some judicial actions. First, a $2 surcharge will be added to all county and
state traffic violations where the offender pleads guilty.264 This surcharge is
expected to raise between $1.05 million and $1.26 million.265 Second, a $3.50
surcharge will be collected for every civil action filed in the state.266 The
Office of the State Courts Administrator expects this to generate $840,706 and
$1,008,847, respectively, for the Fund.267

258. See generally, DAVID M. MITCHELL, ECONOMIC COSTS AND BENEFITS OF
RAISE THE AGE LEGISLATION IN MISSOURI 1 (Nov. 2017) (note his estimates are based
upon the fiscal note compiled for Missouri Senate Bill 40, which is the “Raise the
Age” legislation introduced in 2017 and is substantially similar to Missouri Senate
Bill 793).
259. COMMITTEE ON LEGIS. RES. OVERSIGHT DIV., FISCAL NOTE (June 8, 2018),
https://www.senate.mo.gov/18info/BTS_FiscalNotes/index.aspx?SessionType=R&B
illID=69675271 [perma.cc/X2AH-9XHL] [hereinafter FISCAL NOTE] (discussing the
financial impact of Senate Bill 793).
260. Id.
261. Id.
262. Id.
263. S.B. 793, 99th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2018) (modifying MO. REV.
STAT. § 211.435).
264. Id.
265. FISCAL NOTE, supra note 259.
266. S.B. 793, 99th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2018) (modifying MO. REV.
STAT. § 488.315).
267. FISCAL NOTE, supra note 259.

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol85/iss1/8

32

Briggs: Children Are Our Future

2020]

RAISE THE AGE LEGISLATION

223

The legislation is also likely to result in higher tax revenue because
people without criminal records and periods of incarceration generally earn
more income and thus pay more taxes. For example, a study on Missouri’s
“Raise the Age” legislation compared the income and taxes paid of an average
citizen without a period of incarceration (“Mr. Citizen”) to the income and
taxes paid of a citizen who had been incarcerated for ten years (“Mr.
Criminal”).268 Mr. Criminal’s criminal action cost society approximately
$814,436 over Mr. Criminal’s lifetime when compared to the income earned
and taxes paid by Mr. Citizen.269
Senate Bill 793 ensures Missouri’s seventeen-year-old juveniles do not
face this same loss of earnings. In 2017, there were 430 seventeen-year-old
juveniles serving time in Missouri Department of Corrections facilities.270 On
average, those juveniles will be 23.2 years old when they are first eligible for
release.271 Because of their youth upon entering Missouri Department of
Corrections, they are unlikely to have any significant work experience upon
their release at age 23. Facing the same constraints as Mr. Criminal above,
those 306 juveniles will earn a collective $305.6 million in wages and pay
$62.3 million in taxes.272
On the other hand, if those juveniles fell under the jurisdiction of
Missouri DYS, the state would raise approximately $52 million more in taxes
over the seventeen-year-old juveniles’ lifetimes than if they were incarcerated
in adult prisons.273 They are unlikely to earn wages equal to an adult who has
never committed an act of delinquency (Mr. Citizen), but they earn
significantly more than their counterparts incarcerated in the adult system
(Mr. Criminal).274 Under this assumption, juveniles whose delinquency is
addressed by Missouri DYS are likely to earn approximately $504 million in
lifetime income and pay $114.2 million in lifetime taxes.275

268. MITCHELL, supra note 258, at 7–11. Mr. Citizen’s career begins when he is
eighteen and spans for forty-seven years, and he earns $2.4 million in income and pays
a total of $741,622 in various taxes. Id. at 8. Mr. Criminal also begins work at age
eighteen but commits a crime when he is twenty-one and receives a ten-year sentence.
Id. at 9. When Mr. Criminal is released from jail, he begins to seek employment. Id.
However, his earning potential will remain below Mr. Citizen’s for the rest of his life
for two reasons: first, his felony conviction makes it harder for him to find
employment; and second, because of his felony conviction, he will suffer from a
permanent decrease in wages. Id. Over his lifetime, Mr. Criminal earns $812,421 in
income and pays $167,032 in taxes. Id. at 10.
269. Id. at 10.
270. Id. at 13. Of these prisoners, two were serving life sentences without the
possibility of parole, and the remainder had an average sentence of 7.3 years. Id.
271. Id. at 15. Those juveniles convicted of murder, rape, sexual assault, robbery,
and manslaughter were excluded from this calculation. Id. at 15 n.9.
272. Id. at 15.
273. Id. at 16.
274. Id. at 15–16.
275. Id. at 16.
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In sum, the increase in departmental expenses can be viewed as
immediate cost-shifting and over time cost-saving as Missouri DYS gains
jurisdiction over juveniles the Missouri Department of Corrections loses.
Further, any initial increase in costs due to the increased expense of housing
juveniles in Missouri DYS facilities will likely decrease costs in the future, as
juveniles in residential facilities typically spend less time there than they
would in adult prisons and are less likely to recidivate and enter the adult
system later in their lives.

2. Children Are Our Future: Further Community Reforms to Give
Today’s Children a Chance
The next Section attempts to put “Raise the Age” legislation in context
by outlining some of the other problems facing Missouri juveniles today. The
benefits of Senate Bill 793 should be coupled with reforms to both prevent
children from coming in contact with the juvenile court system and to improve
the system for those juveniles who must face adjudication. Improving access
to education, minimizing the effects of racial disparities, and improving
access to competent and prepared attorneys will ultimately improve outcomes
of affected juveniles. This Section concludes there is still more work to be
done in the Missouri juvenile justice system to improve the futures of
Missouri’s juveniles.
First, further reforms can be aimed at preventing children from entering
the juvenile justice system in the first place. Meeting children’s educational
needs could be a first step in preventing any future acts of delinquency. A
2005 study found the national average for juveniles with educational
disabilities who are confined in correctional facilities was thirty-three
percent.276 These children were more likely to come into contact with the
juvenile justice system as a result of school zero-tolerance policies for certain
behavior that results in immediate suspension or expulsion.277 Zero-tolerance
policies in schools often punish behavior that is a manifestation of an
educational disability; this makes it more likely for students with educational
disabilities to come into contact with the juvenile justice system.278
Missouri’s criminal code does not adequately address this problem.279
Recently, Missouri enacted a new criminal code that may negatively impact
students in Missouri schools by criminalizing behavior previously outside the
reach of juvenile courts.280 While zero-tolerance policies create easy-tofollow, bright line rules for schools, they remove teacher and administrator
276. Lisa M. Geis, An IEP for the Juvenile Justice System: Incorporating Special
Education Law Throughout the Delinquency Process, 44 U. MEM. L. REV. 869, 873
(2014).
277. Id. at 879.
278. Id.
279. Michele L. Moyer, Note, Schoolyard Felons: Missouri’s New Criminal Code
and Its Impact on Schools, 82 MO. L. REV. 1213, 1227 (2017).
280. Id. at 1213–14.
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discretion in addressing student misconduct. Further, Missouri’s education
system has been criticized for failing to keep up with national academic
benchmarks.281 Missouri should consider educational reforms that improve
Missouri students’ academic performance and reduce the “school-to-prison
pipeline.”282 Such reforms could result in less contact with the juvenile justice
system for vulnerable children, thus reducing costs and improving individual
outcomes.
Missouri could also raise the age at which children are eligible for
transfer to the adult criminal justice system. Currently, Missouri allows
children as young as twelve to be transferred and tried in the adult criminal
system. Only two other states – Colorado and Vermont – allow transfer of
children age twelve to adult courts, and only two states – Wisconsin and Iowa
– allow children as young as ten to be transferred to adult courts.283 Most
states set the minimum age of transfer at fourteen.284 By passing Missouri
Senate Bill 793, the state acknowledged juveniles as old as seventeen are not
presumptively fit for the adult criminal justice system. Therefore, it seems
inconsistent to continue to subject juveniles as young as twelve to the adult
criminal system at all. Limiting the number of paths to adult court and
creating reasonable age restrictions for transfer to adult courts is consistent
with the “Raise the Age” movement. Further, such restrictions will protect
Missouri juveniles from the harshness of the adult criminal justice system.
Next, Missouri should make changes to prevent systemic bias and
injustice in the juvenile system. For example, juveniles in Missouri are often
subjected to racial discrimination within the juvenile justice system.285 Race
281. Mae C. Quinn, The Other “Missouri Model”: Systemic Juvenile Injustice in
the Show-Me State, 70 MO. L. REV. 1193, 1203 (2013) (stating a Center on Education
Policy study found Missouri ranked forty-ninth out of fifty in the 2010–2011 school
year for satisfying the educational standards of the No Child Left Behind Act); see
also Valerie Strauss, The Sad Story of Public Education in St. Louis, WASH. POST
(Sept.
7,
2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/answersheet/wp/2017/09/07/the-sad-story-of-public-education-in-stlouis/?utm_term=.9f6d172fd12a [perma.cc/VJ72-3WAX].
282. See generally Kendra Cheek & Justin Bucchio, School-to-Prison Pipeline
Can Be Dismantled Using Alternative Discipline Strategies, JUVENILE JUSTICE INFO.
EXCH. (Sept. 7, 2017), https://jjie.org/2017/09/07/alternative-discipline-strategies-fordismantling-the-school-to-prison-pipeline/ [perma.cc/J9B9-EBHS]; S. David
Mitchell, Zero Tolerance Policies: Criminalizing Childhood and Disenfranchising the
Next Generation of Citizens, 92 WASH. U. L. REV. 271 (2014).
283. UNITED STATES DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFF. OF JUV. JUST. AND DELINQUENCY
PREVENTION STATISTICAL BRIEFING BOOK, MINIMUM TRANSFER AGE SPECIFIED IN
STATUTE (2015), available at https://www.ojjdp.gov/ojstatbb/structure_process/qa04
105.asp [perma.cc/U4EP-QJRN]. Wisconsin has charged a ten-year old girl with
homicide in adult court. See Four Keys Issues in Murder Case of 10-Year-Old Suspect,
ASS’N PRESS (Nov. 9, 2018), https://www.columbiatribune.com/zz/news/20181109/4key-issues-in-murder-case-of-10-year-old-suspect [perma.cc/QX7F-DT2Y].
284. MINIMUM TRANSFER AGE SPECIFIED IN STATUTE, supra note 283.
285. See INVESTIGATION OF THE ST. LOUIS COUNTY FAMILY COURT ST. LOUIS,
MISSOURI, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE 3 (2015).
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shares a strong correlation to other structural inequalities such as poverty,
social disadvantage, lack of neighborhood organization, and lack of access to
upward mobility. These factors mean Missouri’s most vulnerable juveniles
are the ones most likely to face its juvenile justice system.286 In 2015, the
United States Justice Department found “[b]lack children are subjected to
harsher treatment because of their race” in the St. Louis County Family
Court.287 The study also found black children are more likely to experience
formal adjudication, get pretrial detention, and be committed to Missouri DYS
upon violation of the conditions equivalent to probation or parole than
similarly-situated white children.288 This racial disparity means the due
process rights of black juveniles are systematically violated, and Missouri
DYS is receiving children that could be successfully diverted to less restrictive
treatment plans. Reforms aimed at removing racial disparities from the
juvenile justice system would ensure all children receive the best treatment.289
Further, Missouri’s juveniles are systematically denied access to
adequate counsel.290 For example, the same Justice Department study that
found racial discrimination in the St. Louis County Family Court also found
only one public defender was designated to represent all children in the
court.291 In 2014, that St. Louis County public defender handled 394 juvenile
cases.292 Further, in 2012, 4631 new juvenile delinquency and status offense
petitions were reported to the Missouri Supreme Court, but Missouri State
Public Defenders were assigned to only 1923 juvenile cases.293
Approximately sixty-percent of juveniles were left without access to
counsel.294 For those who received assistance from a public defender, that

286. NAT’L RES. COUNCIL, REFORMING JUVENILE JUSTICE: A DEVELOPMENTAL
APPROACH 6–7 (Richard J. Bonnie et al. eds., 2013).
287. INVESTIGATION OF THE ST. LOUIS COUNTY FAMILY COURT ST. LOUIS, supra
note 285, at 3.
288. Id. at 3–4.
289. See Racial Disparities Remain but St. Louis County Family Court Claims
Progress,
ST.
LOUIS
POST-DISPATCH
(May
18,
2018),
https://www.stltoday.com/news/local/crime-and-courts/racial-disparities-remain-butst-louis-county-family-court-claims/article_f7ca1171-2076-5270-b07dfb2a30089b56.html [perma.cc/UNJ5-2QC3].
290. See INVESTIGATION OF THE ST. LOUIS COUNTY FAMILY COURT ST. LOUIS,
MISSOURI, supra note 285, at 8. Missouri’s indigent public defense system has faced
astronomical challenges for years related to limited resources and constant budget
shortcomings. Id. at 3.
291. Richard Pérez-Peña, St. Louis County Biased Against Black Juveniles, Justice
Department
Finds,
THE
N.Y.
TIMES
(July
21,
2015)
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/01/us/st-louis-county-biased-against-blackjuveniles-justice-department-finds.html [perma.cc/9UQ2-KVLN].
292. Id.
293. MARY ANN SCALI ET AL., NAT’L JUV. JUST. DEFENDER CTR., MISSOURI:
JUSTICE RATIONED 34–35 (2013).
294. Id. at 35.

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol85/iss1/8

36

Briggs: Children Are Our Future

2020]

RAISE THE AGE LEGISLATION

227

public defender only had time to devote 4.6 hours to their case.295 An
underfunded public defense system negatively impacts juveniles in a special
way: juveniles already have a diminished capacity to understand the
consequences of their actions by virtue of their age, and thus without
representation, struggle to understand the intricacies of the system they face.
Adequately funding the Missouri State Public Defender would ensure children
facing the daunting juvenile system have the legal assistance they need to
successfully navigate the system.296
“Raise the Age” legislation is a smart move for Missouri’s juveniles, but
the system is not perfect. Further reforms can ensure fewer children are
subjected to a juvenile court and are treated fairly if they do find themselves
in a juvenile court. Guaranteeing equal access to education, raising the
minimum age at which a child can be tried as an adult, minimizing the effect
race plays in the juvenile justice system, and providing children access to
adequate counsel will all ensure fewer children end up in juvenile courts
across the state and receive better outcomes when they do.

V. CONCLUSION
The “Raise the Age” movement represents the United States’ changing
attitude in addressing juvenile delinquency. The movement indicates the
United States has come far from treating children as miniature adults. Since
neuroscience uncovered the developmental arc of adolescent brains,
legislatures and judiciaries across the nation have participated in the “Raise
the Age” movement by working to incorporate the changing understanding of
juvenile delinquency into the legal system of the United States.
Missouri has long been a leader in the area of juvenile justice reform.
The creation of Missouri DYS was a revolution in the late twentieth century.
However, the success of Missouri’s juvenile system in rehabilitating children
has been overshadowed by cases like Julian Mathews. Because of an outdated
law premised on a misunderstanding of juvenile delinquency, Julian Mathews
may be burdened with adult consequences for childish actions. Missouri
Senate Bill 793 changes that for future children. The new law also benefits
communities where children like Julian live through long-term cost savings
and by lowering crime rates. Overall, Senate Bill 793 reflects a juvenile
system that is ultimately concerned with the well-being and safety of every
child and recognizes we are all better when our children are happier, healthier,
and safer.

295. AM. BAR ASSOC., THE MISSOURI PROJECT: A STUDY OF THE MISSOURI PUBLIC
DEFENDER SYSTEM AND ATTORNEY WORKLOAD STANDARDS 15 (2014), available at
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/events/legal_aid_indigent_defendants
/2014/ls_sclaid_5c_the_missouri_project_report.authcheckdam.pdf [perma.cc/QNJ9JJTV]. Public defenders should be averaging 19.5 hours per juvenile case. Id. at 6.
296. See generally id.; Taylor Payne, Note, Plight of the Public Defender:
Excessive Caseload as a Non-Mitigating Factor in Sanctions for Ethical Violations,
83 MO. L. REV. 1087 (2018).
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